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Monday, January 22, 2024

Positive win win deal for AsianParent/ParentINC

Recently more negative news from startup world than positive ones (Vizzio fraudulent founder, lomotif owner delisting/crashing, Live17 crashing etc), so it’s good to have a positive newsflow from a now considered old time entrepreneur tech Roshni who runs parentinc.

Met her way back in 2011-12, her Asianparent business just started not long. Got her involved in a founder peer group and I think her best takeaway besides hopefully some learning, is her now husband.

Long story short, she took some money from vertex and later from more investors and now just bought motherswork. Also expanded over the years to 12m usd revenue in 2021. Multiple countries and product now media and ecommerce. Only thing not so good is still very loss making at 6.9m usd losses. That’s 2 years ago during the crazy days, it seems like they got the memo to rightsize for profit and claims ebidta positive now. Time will show.

On surface looks like good buy if not too expensive. Some comments.

1) deal definitely accretive since AP still loss making. Gross margins may be worse in retail as online media is very high GP. Also helps revenue by boosting it 10-15m right away. I suspect that’s why can grow from 12m usd to 30m usd in 2 years.

2) Omnichannel as a strategy I am less sure. You can Omni.. but I think still must be either online or physical at scale first. And the skill sets to run either side are not the same. So need to build great mgmt depth for each side. So far retail Omni really strong one I can’t think of any… it’s either retail first like lulu, Charles and Keith and sell a good chunk profitably online or online first like neiwai, jd  with some offline stores for presence.

3) community always works if you can build it. Whether it’s for online media, e-commerce or retail. So this part I totally agree and they have a nice niche topic.

4) MW angle makes sense too. The 2 equal founders have taken it to this size over many years. Nearing retirement at late 50s. So probably negotiating some cash and upside in stock makes sense. Esp if no one to take over. 

5) 70+m usd target in 3 years is 24% growth rate on top line. I think it’s a good target and achievable if can integrate MW and expand Ecommerce sales. Issue is how do the margins look like? They are already experiencing the margin drag since starting to sell online in 2021 where revenue may have doubled due to ecommerce but the gross margins dropped further.

6) deal terms can’t tell. But can see MW Intl wing not big. 4-5m in sales and barely profitable. Local wing no filing est Sg probably similar size or slightly larger as just 2 stores. Price should be like retail valuation with maybe a slight bump as it’s not all in cash. My guess is <20m sgd depending on profitability. And likely below 10m. 


Nb: parent inc issued about 1+m usd in shares to motherswork owners. So likely deal was below 10m for sure. Using high valuation shares to buy is good move if you can convince the SME owner.

Sunday, January 7, 2024

Outlook for late stage asean tech startups in 2024


(Update 2025 Jan : ipo definitely not recovered yet and looks like trade sales also very little. Stand by all the points below except it looks like 2025 at best will be a mildly improved version of 2024. It mostly depends on improving metrics by our startups. Environment don’t look bullish at all still).

Having ongoing discussions with Shao-Ning Huang on investment allocation and plans for the year ahead. 

For the startup and Vc side in this region, we also came to same conclusion as article below. Essentially :

https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/startups-tech/startups/tech-ipos-could-see-another-mild-year-bar-good-listings-raised

1) from 2016-2021 : ecosystem value growth way too much over cashflow sustainability. Investors and founders push towards ever higher valuation without any validation what public market will accept across in more normal times.

2) the various SPACS & IPO from 2020 to now - buka, Grab, Pgru, Moneyhero, Prenetics and most recently live17, proves that latest round private valuations went ahead by almost 50-80% to their current public valuation. Amazing!

3) so if you a late stage startup (last round above 500m valuation) like many many I know, you know markets are going cut you down unless you have great story. 

What’s a great story? To me it should be at least >50m revenue, growth of >25% forward and at least 5m net profit to be worth maybe $300-500m. And that’s a min bar and means local listing cuz too small for nasdaq. If loss making, then at least 100-200m revenue, growing at >30% and losses narrowing annually since 2022. And net losses must be less than 20% of revenue. This one depending on sector and potential can be nasdaq. And if Nasdaq valuation can still be 1+b.

4) so the options for founders and existing investors is to wait and let company grow more into right financials and/or for public markets to get more risk taking and frothy again. The latter is out of founder control and unlikely in 2024. The former is within control but I am shocked at how many startups still can lose more than 20% of their revenue per year. It’s shows cost is out of control and very bad decisions being made on sales side.

Ask yourself. Do you really need a PA or chief of staff?  Can a role be combined with another? Can you use a non pedigree grad or less experience grad to do? This product/market worth investing in or just because it helps revenue look good but actually barely viable?  If any answer is because it looks good for next round, it’s probably worth rethinking what if there is no easy next round.

Stop it with the moves to look good financially and actually be good financially. Role model after profitable players like sea, secret lab, charles&keith not Adam Neumann type and ARKK fund companies (except coin base, Tesla etc). If your thesis of capturing revenue is not working out, remove the product, don’t keep insisting on scaling something with bad unit economics.

5) another less desirable option is force a small IPO/spac/reverse listing. Most of these are 100-200m market cap, inject less than 10m and the underwriters earn a big chunk for the risk they take. 

Then company pay the price in terms of poor publicity, bad stock pricing and subsequent drop in valuation. Moratorium will be an issue. If not lucky, day traders punt your stock and plenty of strange price movements.To me this move is a bad one and is just slightly above distressed round or sale.

6) how about trade sales then? It’s possible but most trade sales are <150m usd. Any larger need a really big player to swallow. So for those unicorns and almost unicorns it’s a massive down round too. And that’s provided any buyer wants a loss making startup in this climate.

7) the same late stage issue will hit the mid stage startups who are doing 10-30m revenue too. So my advice for this group is the same. Chase good revenues and run a lean ship assuming no more or expensive minimal new money. 

8)  unfortunately, I do think those b,c,d onwards startups that run out of money this year without any compelling story are in big trouble. It’s either a big down round like 30-70% down to match listed comparables or distressed sale/closure.  It’s good for ecosystem but it’s painful for employees, suppliers, investors/founders. 

Those that have cash until 2025, things on exit and IPOs and even funding  should be better from 2h2024 onwards.But anything can happen. Eg bad usa recession or worse inflation coming back…. So again it’s back same story.. get cashflow positive and profitable to create good optionality. Let’s see how our founders and mgmt react.…..

As for our portfolio, we invest and count on private markets 20 mths to 120 mths lateer. So it’s not that affected by current listed sentiment. So it makes sense to always invest if have unlimited cash. But we do not obviously. So it’s like buying when crashing, we decided to invest still but at same slower pace (3-4 new startups and some follow on) as in 2023 which is a good 50% down from peak back in 2021. 

Barring big situation change of course. If we have a big exit, we will relook as it is a good time to invest into seed/A rounds due to more grounded valuations and founders. If a recession hits, then maybe can invest a bit more as its easier to build a new startup during a recession.  Read about our startup portfolio here.

Tuesday, January 2, 2024

Startup Portfolio Review for 2023 - Navigating the Funding Winter & Green Shoots

(Please read 2021 and 2022 reports for context. This post is my annual review of our startup portfolio, you can read my overall life review for 2023 here)

Navigating is truly the apt word. Because of the funding winter (and it was a real winter with 1H2023 funding falling off a cliff and listed loss making tech not rebounding until 2H2023), high interest rates and shaky tech demand of 2023. These factors affected our startups in very diverse ways. Some who rely on the domestic mainstream economy continued to grow revenues well, others were badly affected as they depend on tech firm budgets, still others were hit hard as they are too deeply loss making and need new funding which did not materialize etc. But there was one thing in common, every founder of ours finally got the message that if they were not profitable, or on path to profit quite soon, or growing super rapidly in a blue ocean space, they are now worth much much less than their last round raised. One silver lining is by end 2023, listed markets have stabilized and in fact profitable tech are near all time highs. Though with loss making tech still 60-70% below highs, it will interesting to see how 2024 plays out for our startup space. More on that later. But first our activity and performance.

We continued investing in 2023. But this time even more cautiously with a big portion of funds reserved for follow ons. In total, we invested in just 3 new startups. This is a low for us. And the thing all 3 have in common is they are all profitable in 2023. We also did 6 follow ons for our existing startups. Total new money committed into startup is 33% lower than 2022. Don’t forget 2022 is already 20% lower than 2021 which was our all time high of investing into startups. We made a conscious decision to not add anymore allocation to startups until we get a clearer picture ecosystem/portfolio wise.

The good news is we on track for our 50 startups goal and the overall IRR since 2015 is 23%. This is down from
28% last year. Also TVPI stayed dropped marginally to 2.57 due to more capital added. Still good performance but not great compared to QQQ. Also, these top level portfolio numbers hide so much variance inside. In 2023, the failures and down rounds came in significant  numbers as VCs pulled back on the founders who couldn't grow revenues and cut costs fast enough. We had one startup take a down round that resulted in our stake worth just 40% of last round. Sabo by an investor that kept putting off signing on the deal. In the end, existing investor save them but on a down round. Another one totally failed as cannot secure funding.  That resulted in a 400K writedown for us. And finally another 2 that we already wrote down in 2022, closed down in 2023.

On the positive side and boding well for 2024, 4Q saw a flurry of new A rounds where 4 of our startups had term sheets with 3 closing the deal before year end. It was these final uplifts that negated the 2 big negatives. The rest of the portfolio also had a lot of variance in performance internally but because no new round, it doesnt affect the IRR. But we are glad to see that almost all of our remaining 41 startups are alive and kicking and got the message that funding is no longer easy.  Hopefully they permanently have a mindset shift to rely more on sales and cost control rather than focusing on new funding to build  their business.

On the VC portfolio front, i commented last year that its amazing how there were no write downs and speculated on the reasons. I am glad to see realism come into play this year as the VC side suffered 10-15% writedown in value. Overall TVPI is at 2.34 vs 2.6 last year. This is much more realistic in my opinion. IRR hard to calculate but definitely down a fair bit to mid to high teens.

What's most positive and promising for 2023 and indeed even in 2022 is that our cash inflow from PE is positive each year. We are getting distributions that exceed the new cash we are investing. We need that to continue and grow even more next 2-3 years if we are to hit our 100 startup goal and stay active in ecosystem. We have been in investing mode from 2013 to 2021 and have hit our cap for this asset class already. So we need to be using recycled capital moving forward. 

And this is the biggest issue with our ecosystem - distribution for many startup portfolios is  bad. The data from one research report I read puts 2016-2018 vintage funds at just 0.04 dpi and 2013-2015 vintages at 0.4. Ours is at 0.3 and can be considered mostly a 2015/16 vintage. Anyway  even 0.3 is way too low to be attractive for 7-8 year portfolio. For comparison, our American side similar/younger vintage PE/VC funds are already at 0.4 to 1.2 dpi.

On AngelCentral side, the picture mirrors the larger market and our personal portfolio. AngelCentral also ran a behavioral survey of 100+ angels which shows a marked slowdown in funding activity. Our angels funded about 3.6m in 2023 which is a good 25% down from 2022 number. Membership stayed roughly the same but some angels are cutting smaller cheques or pausing/dropping out. One advice,  if you are an angel, do remember it’s a portfolio game. So you need to have at least 15-20 startups before stopping/pausing. If you are thinking of angel investing, this is a good time. Valuations are fairer now and there is much less competition.

Looking forward, macro picture looks like the fed will not be increasing IR any further and inflation seems under control. So capital markets side should stabilize but I think at least for this year, we won’t see a return of loss making growth stocks doing very well. Case in point, ARKK fund is still trading at 35% of all time high. Or closer to home - grab, buka, moneyhero,17live are all trading way below their most recent private rounds done and of course below their spac or IPO price. I don’t see any macro catalyst for them to rerate upwards. Consumer spending is not going to be strong with high IR weighing on household mortgages. Salaries also won’t grow much this year. There is also still a risk of recession happening in the USA and continued China weakness. These will definitely weigh on all ASEAN businesses.

So if I am a founder of a larger startup, I would continue to focus on getting profitable so that I have more options and don’t have to take big dilutive down or flat rounds. Being profitable consistently and maybe still
growing moderately will also give your company a valuation multiple pegged to QQQ rather than to ARKK. And if possible, don’t be in a position where you need funding and have big losses at the same time. 

On the topic of big losses, I have been monitoring the Acra reports of quite a few VC funded names that are in series B or C and I find their latest 2022/3 financials still ridiculous in terms of losses they are making. We are talking about quite famous startups that make X (where X>5 or 10) million revenues and lose 0.5Xto 1.5X.  I comment on them sometimes in my fb posts. I hope these companies financials improve this year and I truly wonder which investors are willing to back them in 2024/25 when they run out of cash. Maybe it’s better for them to shut down so that they don’t suck up capital and talent.

As an investor, we should continue investing if we can. Be more discerning and picky and walk away from founders who haven’t got the memo. Ning and I are quietly confident that our ecosystem will deliver next 2-3 years. One key thing to look out for will be successful IPO or large trade sale of companies like kredivo, ninja van, moglix, carsome etc. One caveat is that looking at current market conditions, the pricing multiple could be quite weak if they try for exit/IPO this year but at least they will generate some liquidity for many investors. Eg. live17 is now 33% of de spac price. To me that’s fair value. Likewise for moneyhero and many other asean startups. Anyway for angel and early investors, even exiting at 0.5-1b instead of 3b will probably give solid returns!
 



Thursday, December 28, 2023

A Purposeful Life - 2023 in review

2023 has been a much better year than 2022 for me. 2022 was a year of waiting and limbo with house hunting/renovation, portfolios crashing and 2 older kids going thru NS. But in 2023 many of these things came to an end or resolved themselves and life got going well again.

Year started with a new addition to family- Kody our black dog adopted from SPCA. He has really changed our family life. Now Ning and I have to walk him daily for 1 hr each time, kids have to do the evening one. Nights now include saying goodnight to him and lots of time spent consoling him during thunderstorms!

We also resumed travel a lot more. Managed our first post Covid full family vacation to Taiwan. And year end managed to bring Dad and mother in law to  Australia for a pretty long drive. Also discovered Ning and I really love nature in Iceland. In total we traveled about 76 days this year which is more than in 2022 but less than the usual 80-90 days pre Covid

Main reason is we are a lot busier with angel work, volunteer work and also want to be around for the 4 boys. Number 1 finished NS and entered NUS. Number 2 finishing NS probably going to do law next year, number 3 took up badminton as a key sport and Number 4  continues to surprise us with his willingness to twist what we say and assert his personal reality distortion field.

To recap no change in life purposes, i have centered myself on the 3 purposes below.

Purpose 1 - Help and be there for family. Extend to friends if i can.
Purpose 2 - Be as healthy as I can
Purpose 3 - Be a good custodian of wealth and knowledge. help grow startup ecosystem via angel investing & AngelCentral.  Contribute to broader society as a volunteer.

Purpose 1: Be there for family. Share and guide kids more. Maintain friendships.

Overall rate this purpose a 7.5.

It’s tough being parents to 4 kids aged 9 to 21. Every day we need to switch mindsets as we help each of them navigate school, sports, NS, university etc. What works well is to discuss with Ning and come to joint decisions on key strategic items and operational issues. Dad wise, he now comes to stay with us every alternate weekend but in time, he may want/need to stay with us more. Arrangement seems to work fine. He had a scare with his eye and it was quite worrying. Lucky it resolved itself and he was even able to resume traveling - to Iceland no less!

The most important relationship with wife is mostly good as we both practice being mindful of each others priorities and desires. She too is learning more each day about ourselves and the world we live in.  I must say I am very proud of all the 4 boys and my dearest wife. 

Friends harder to keep in regular touch. Still the same catch up over dinner or drinks every few mths. But it’s nice to see mostly everyone grow older happily.

It was a good move to move into current place as our older boys appreciate the privacy of having own room. We also at least now have a study of our own and dad has a room too.

Purpose 2 : Be as healthy as I can mind and body

Rate this 8.5

I lost weight more as walking the dog daily made Ning and I lose weight. Now weight range is 64-65 consistently. Diet wise is still eat anything I want but can’t eat too much and definitely can’t eat post 10pm. Also manage to tone down on wine consumption to about 3-4 bottles per month between 2 of us. Sleep is fine and have added magnesium pills before sleep as it helps sleep better. Fell sick only twice or thrice of which once was repeat Covid a few mths back. 

If I am honest, I do get mentally bored at times esp when everyone is up and about and I am alone at home. But filling up all the time with work just to keep busy also feels like a cop out and lack of imagination to me. So I try to exercise and meditate and entertain myself. Am toying with online courses in history or literature as a good use of spare time.

Purpose 3 : Preserve & Grow Wealth - 10% annualized net IRR on networth+ Quality startup angel work for 100 startups+ build AngelCentral + good volunteer 

I would rate this 7.5 this year. Much improved from 2022 as markets all rebounded and even our startup portfolio  thawed from the funding winter and started getting some investments in 4Q2023. But we made a major allocation mistake by keeping 30% of stock portfolio in sg and China stocks. This drag pulled down our overall stock performance to 20+% in sgd terms which is about acwi but below SPY. But it’s still a great rebound and we are almost fully allocated into equities all the time which is very important for long term investors. Cash is a drag, bonds marginally better and market timing is very very hard.

Will write more on startup side in a separate post as always but in summary - overall its down for PE side as the VC/PE funds we invested in write down their NAVs over the year. 

We also crossed 48 startup investments this year with clear green shoots appearing 4Q2023. Not just new uprounds for our startups but also some exits from our PE and VC funds.  Not a lot but at least this year it’s more cash in from PE than out to our startups investments. 

Couldn’t hit the 10% investment/networth IRR this year with PE not contributing and in fact negative. But we believe over time, PE will kick in strong again. Long term IRR since 2012 is now down to 9% or so if we mark to market all the PE.

AngelCentral also saw the same decline with our angels funding easily 25% less than year before. Membership is stable, though not growing. The good news is final quarter had 4 startups going into up rounds so it’s good vindication of our clubs selection ability. 

For startups, we also had 3 startups go into distress and still undergoing liquidation. What’s painful in these cases is when the founder doesn’t want to let go and close down and when the founder starts to plan only for themselves and obviously doesn’t care about investor fairness anymore. It’s mentally not fun to have to deal with the uglier side of human natures. Easy thing to do is write off and ignore them but Ning and I believe in fairness and things being done properly. So we push back sometimes if we feel treated unfairly even if there is no economic rationale. 

Anyway have made a in depth post on startup portfolio here.

Finally on volunteer work, I finally retired from my District councilor role with SWCDC after 14 years of volunteering. Reason is because the HwaChong volunteer role is quite involved. So to do a good job, something has to give. Rest of volunteer work with PEP, ITE, IPOS, NRF remain.

So overall, 2023 has been a good year. Kids all growing older and we think we are managing ok as parents. Spousal relationship is better than ever as we both settle into more synched expectations of life. Still get lots of mental and emotional challenge with the portfolio and startups so that’s good. But the interactions that expose the ugliness of human nature is quite draining.

I do think 2024 will be more of the same where our key challenge is parenting well. Startup side should rebound more and I expect more exits from the PE/Vc fund with later stage startups and maturity coming up. Valuations will be the issue. It seems like public markets no longer buy a story of high multiples because revenue growing well or market potential good. They also want profits or near profits and cashflow. See latest 17live, moneyhero spacs as examples. And rightly so.  As for listed portfolio, I don’t think there will be another 20% gain on equities or bonds…will be lucky if eke out a 7-10% return. Maybe China will surprise us all…

Tuesday, November 14, 2023

Sea testing new low?

Update for 1Q2024

Quick summary. Doing well on all 3 fronts. Again mgmt thinking is long term to make Shopee number 1 - building the best channel, tools & service for merchants with best economics for consumers and logistics. Key points.

1) free fire is back to 10+% bookings growth. They think can be evergreen franchise.

2) Shopee live is doing well esp in indo.  Regionally it’s record revenue and gmv. Bank npl stay at 1.4% and 40% loans inside Shopee ecosystem. This is real synergy.

3) financially, small net loss but operating wise is big rebound on operating profit to +71m from -56m last Q and also 20+% growth on revenue YonY. Revenue is above expectations.

4) all in, a good quarter and guidance is to continue. I will hold as I am fully allocated to sea already since last year. Trading at undemanding 2.5x  to forward sales and have 8.6b usd in cash.

Update for 4Q2023. Solid rebound in revenue growth for Shopee. Overall much more positive 2024 guidance from sea. Main point is TikTok and lazada aren’t taking market share from them. Garena stabilizing and I see much opportunity to grow MariBank further profitability. Glad I did not sell anything and in fact bought call options at 45 since last earnings. Blended breakeven now 76. Sold a put at 48 to express mild bullishness but recognizing already big position so won’t add more. Let’s see the quarters ahead. If they pull off 2024 with improved profit and revenues in 15-25% growth, back to 80 -100 won’t be a problem. 


Update for 3Q2023 earnings where SE reported flat DE, 18% growth in ecommerce and 36% growth in financial services. Revenue at 3.3b beat expectations but unfortunately they fell into a 140m loss when expectations were for small or no profit. To me this is telling of competition they are facing on Shopee side and is a big issue. My thesis for sea is that they will be top winner in the e-commerce marketplace battle in ASEAN. If TikTok or Lazada can overtake them then sea is not a no brainer long term multibagger bet anymore.

Reading the transcript, what Forrest identifies as the 3 main levers and metrics makes sense. And he is saying sea wants to entrench themselves deep for the long term and since cash flow allows for it, he would focus on that rather than focus on delivering more profits. What market did not expect is that 330m profits would turn into 140m of losses.

Personally, we had a full sized SEA position accumulated since 2022 to now at average price of about 88. It’s now 60% down again revisiting the low formed after 2Q results where Forrest also spoke about being in investing mode again. For readers, so you get right context, our full size for single stocks is at most just 4-5% of total equity positions. Bulk of our positions are in ETFs always. So this year is still up mid teens due to indexes rebounding.

So what’s our plan? Can sell, add or hold as always. Sell is out for now. I don’t think mgmt has lost the plot. They are certainly facing strong competition. Otherwise how can grow revenue 18% and still move into losses? Must be spending more on marketing, vouchers, incentives etc.

Hold is my answer for now just like after 2Q. Can trade some options to play the volatility but not adding more cash to main holding. It’s ok to be underallocated from max. We need 2-3 more quarters at least to see if they are indeed holding and growing against competitors.

We will only want to add if it hits ridiculously cheap values. Right now at 20b valuation less 2b net cash, sea is trading at 1.4-1.6 times annualized sales. If it ever falls to 1 time or between 25-30, I think risk reward is excellent and will double down in large amount. Amzn is trading at 3 times, meli at 5 times, baba at 1.6 times. So SE at 1 will be hard to ignore.

In terms of what it means for startups, using sea and grab as apex startups from ASEAN, the picture is not too good actually. Our 2 biggest asean tech players are worth $32b usd combined. Smaller than any of SG 3 local banks.  What does that say of the value created last 10 years? 

Sea and grab impact on consumers is clear and large. Between the extremes of current pessimism and past bullishness for these tech companies, I think the final fair valuation answer is probably in-between and it all depends on their execution, growth and profits next few years.



 


Friday, November 3, 2023

Tech in Asia exit - new norm lens

Nice ending to an entrepreneurial journey. Kudos to team for working at this business for 13 years and securing what looks to be an ok outcome for early investors and founder.  We need many more such exits for our ecosystem to be considered successful!

TIA last raised 6.6m usd in 2017 led by Hanwah on a post money of about $25m usd if I remember right. In total, raised about 17.7m sgd and founder end up about 16+%

TIA did about 7.6m sgd in 2022 and reverted to loss making of about 600k. Profitable in 2021 with 900k profit on 7m. 2022 subscription weakened and they grew poorer margin production business. 

It’s also important to note that revenue growth from 2017 to 2022 is barely 6-7% per annum from 5.5 to 7.6m.  So it has plateau and is not a growth company any more. So selling is probably a good move. Remember my last post about growth being worth something only if profits are good too? TIA got the memo.. slow down growth but move from very loss making on 5.5m to nearer profits on 7.6m. 

I do think SPH media won’t overpay as a non profit funded by taxpayers but TIA shareholders also won’t sell unless in distress (I don’t think so). The number will come out in due time but my guess is between 30ish-50ish million sgd. Revenue multiple between 4-8 seems fair. Probably no meaningful PE to use. 

If use midpoint of estimate at 40m sgd, then everyone ok and it’s a decent story in terms of capital efficiency vs outcome. Management team I would expect them to be incentivized further via some form of earn out.

The interesting thing to see is post deal, whether the new SPH will be better at integrating acquired assets. It’s mostly new management so should give them benefit of the doubt. And it’s a good acquisition of production and media talent for the new entity. Also give them a regional subscriber base. The big question is how to integrate and how to resume the revenue growth using existing team  if that is the goal.

Thursday, November 2, 2023

Valuation outlook for asean startups - what’s the public market saying?

It looks like the worst case scenario of a bad recession coupled with high inflation won't happen. Instead, the scenario playing out last year is one of decent wage growth underpinning consumption and so ensuring any resultant recession will be very mild. In the meantime, the fed has indicated it is quite happy with overnight rate at 5+% and will keep it here while waiting for core inflation to weaken further. This situation may take another 6-18mths to play out.

So while the broader economy is looking ok, the pain is being felt more and more clearly in the startup and growth space as the high IR environment drives major reallocation and behavioral change by investors.

I have multiple post Series B startups telling me investors are bearish and investors are very slow in cutting new cheques. This is a consequence of the above environment.

Bottom line is valuation metrics and multiples have changed. Some recent datapoints to share: 

1) Listed tech giants have held up pretty well. Latest quarter, they have still managed to show 10-13% top line growth and solid profits. So it’s not surprise QQQ is up 30% YTD still while the broader based SPY is up almost 10%. This attests to the FAANG pricing power in face of inflation and their ability to squeeze out more profit. QQQ is trading at 28 times profit while SPY is trading at 24.5.

On the much smaller market cap and loss making side, the picture is not good still and many usa listed tech are flat to small gain for the year. A good proxy is ARKK etf less Tesla gains which is 11% of portfolio. My estimate is ARKK barely gained 3-4% this year after a disastrous 2022 once we strip out Tesla rebound this year.

2) China tech giants have fallen a lot due to a combination of actual slowing growth/profits/weak Chinese economy and western/developed world sentiment on China. Baba and tencent are trading in their teens. A good 30%-50% cheaper than USA tech giants. 

3) from ASEAN perspective, our listed tech companies are not doing well. SEA, Grab, Buka, Goto, PGRU are all down YTD anything from 10-50%! in spite of their USA counterparts staying flattish. The main reasons are partly rerating for asean tech stocks along with China stocks and partly due to unimpressive financials and outlook.

4) More specifically,  here are some listed valuations which have many unlisted startup counterparts in asean.

a)  Financial comparison space. There is a giant in uk called moneysupermart trading at 3.5x sales and 19 times profit. Our asean moneyhero just ipo via spac and even after 60-70% plunge in stock price is trading at <1 times revenue or barely 50m usd because it’s grossly loss making. But even if they turn profitable, at most they do a 5-10m profit. That’s a valuation of $200m at best. Moneyhero reached unicorn status last private round so later round investors should be quite concerned. Likewise moneysmart which is Singapore’s best player would need to get solidly profitable if it wants to ipo and be valued well like moneysupermart instead of like moneyhero.

b) Coworking. Wework is about to go bankrupt. But even a profitable IWC - Regus which should benefit from wework closure is trading at just 0.4 times revenue. So all the coworking space players should assume much weaker valuations until they prove out solid profits.

Closer to home, there is a rollup trying to spac and I suspect wework bankruptcy is going to give big problem.

c) Car disruption space. Carvana is trading at 0.4 times revenue and is loss making still. This is just 10% of peak in 2021. Perhaps a better comparison is carsales.com.au trading at 18-19 times profit or about 10.9b market cap! Now that’s a solid business. If you are loss making car player, you want Carsales type of steadier financial metrics rather than be valued at 0.4 of gmv which again will be huge downrounds for later round investors of carro or carsome.

d) Property tech space. The benchmark here is propguru locally and rea group in Australia. PGRU Ipo via spac and stock price has been rerated to 1/3 of ipo price. Now valuation is an undemanding 5-6 times revenue. To get a better valuation need to be profitable and dominant in good size market. The benchmark here is Rea group is worth 20b aud and is valued at 17 times ttm sales. 

The above explains why ohmyhome stock has difficulty rising. Market cap of 50m usd on 4-5m sgd revenue and loss making points to it being overvalued even now. Why buy ohmyhome when Pgru is cheaper and much better. Now what does this bode for still private startups? Perhaps be a profitable property agent that is tech enabled is better. 

e) Logistics. This space is more advanced and more positive with J&T, lalamove, cainiao all ipo or ready to IPO on Hk exchange. Valuations are significantly below last round highs but at least public markets validating their ipo and J&T has managed to ipo at 3x revenue. This bodes well for ninja van actually.

List goes on. It seems like among loss making ipo or listco, only saas businesses have held up decently with valuations cut by 30-50% only. 

My advice to founders of larger startups who are nearer trade sale or ipo stage?

Nothing overcomes a bearish climate and sentiment better than clear net profits, strong positive cash flow and some growth. If you used to put a 20% emphasis on profit and 80% on growth, perhaps flipping it would be wiser in the near to medium term unless your area is very special and blue ocean like openAI and you are growing 2-3x or more annually.

For the rest of the more normal tech/growth companies - I remember before 2012, later stage valuations were never about just multiple on sales or future potential. It was always more weighted towards multiple on net profit. Not operating profit, not adjusted level profit but GAAP standard net profit. 

So if you can, build out both profit and growth where profit is now more important than growth. It is very disturbing to scan our series c, d companies and see them very loss making even on 50m or 100m revenues. Makes one doubt the quality of their gross profits and margins.

I cannot stress how much freedom and options you have once you make your own profit. You can use it to further invest, buy out impatient shareholders, pay yourself better etc. Don’t  forget many many successful entrepreneurs have not taken Vc money. And outcome can still be great. There are 2800 gcb in sg, I believe Vc funded tech founder owners account for less than 1% of them.

How about founders running early stage startups and early investors? Actually this space hasn’t been affected that much. Valuations have gone down somewhat but because it’s very far from exit, investors are still cutting cheques but maybe 20-30% less. To me, founders in seed and series A should still do the same thing of building great product, proving product market fit and then scaling it further. Early investors are also fine. If you invest below $6-7m post round, an exit at 30-50m is still not bad. For example, the early investors of a recent exit techinasia or affable are still fine. But I think their last stage investors esp for TIA will not have done so well.

Friday, September 15, 2023

Doing much better now - Carousell

Readers will know I did an analysis  back in 2016 and updated it in 2018. In 2016, I was quite disturbed because they have not switched on revenue tap after 4-5 years.   My reason is that the organization cannot learn what works and build the right sized complement of capabilities internally if it does not start charging. Also I think very much from founder pov and I felt the amount of dilution the founders took was not optimal for their own life outcome.

Then in 2018, I commented again as they finally switched on the revenue and the initial revenue was very low at 1+m compared to expenses and valuation. 


Then things got better for them. They used their high valuation to acquire some solid revenues from SPH and OLX. I thought this was a very good move. Much like grab buying Jaya and now transcab.  These moves helped a lot. They also learned how to sell and are trying to earn a cut from all the activity happening.


Now 5 years later, I think carousell is a changed animal for the better. Mgmt has matured, usage is still strong at 35m visits per mth. Still loss making but with 100+m revenues but it should be sustainable if they run lean to ensure low overheads and pick high gross margin verticals to enter. And very important, the direction seems clear as Siu rui articulated a clear positioning for the company as the dominant asean classifieds that focuses on sustainability. 


So moving forward, I see 2 key challenges. First, pick and grow the right verticals that are very large and the company can grow into. At same time these verticals cannot be cash intensive and/or too low margin. I would avoid jobs, property if I can. Incumbents way too strong and synergies not great. Used cars maybe as there are profitable models whether it is listings or transactional. And if growth is by acquisition, the internal capability to integrate is critical. Second, the environment has changed at later stage investor and listed side. Listed side investors now want to see both profit and growth esp if niche areas. So mgmt have to walk that balance to show both are happening. And all this time, they must make sure have enough cash. 


These 2 challenges are not easy. Verticals usually have incumbents. And they can be very strong. See seek and propguru, sgcarmart/motorist etc. Other verticals may be weaker but their gross margins are poor and fraught with execution risk. See theRealReal and redbonz in the 2nd hand fashion space. 


So assuming mgmt navigate well, what will success look like in medium term? 


To me good execution will be to succeed in 1-2 verticals that are large and growing well. Eg fashion, watches, used cars etc. Financially, breakeven or very small loss on revenue of usd200m in 3 years. Then the valuation will  likely go back >$1b.  I am assuming interest rates stay high which means growth stocks no longer have a crazy premium. 


Case in point, job classifieds can make $30m net profit on 100m sales. Company will be valued at 1B even if growing just 10-15%. So if carousell can blend out a gross profit of 35-40%, then its revenue needs to double to $200m to have a gross profit of $70m. And if  lean like a job classified on overheads, it will be worth the 1b or so. 


Or if we want to compare against currently listed entities, propguru does about 110m usd revenue, growing in low to mid teens and is valued at 5 times revenue less cash on hand. So that triangulates with the 200m revenue number. And this assumes the GP  both are same. I suspect propguru will always be higher margin but carousell may be growing faster if they pick big solid underserved verticals.

Saturday, September 2, 2023

So what do with SEA- a losing core stock?

Quick thoughts on how to handle a losing stock like sea.  It’s the biggest loser in our portfolio this year (almost everything else is up) and we have a good chunk of it as it’s one of the few stocks that we stock pick and own. 

Latest quarter, growth rates just mid single digits at 5.2%. Grew profits to 330m but stock plunged. reason is: 

- sea is facing competition by Lazada and possibly TikTok.  No new big game on the horizon to replace the declining free fire.

- mgmt (rightly) wants to reinvest more into growth and so the 300+m quarterly profit may reduce or even go negative. So investors get jittery.

So how to view a stock that has lost 60% of value from our buy price? We obviously believe in the mgmt otherwise we would have cut loss at 20-30%.  But we have not added much as the logic is down can go down more. Lucky for us. And we also kept to our overall limit per stock of 5% of portfolio.

Now of course sea is down to 1.5-2% of portfolio esp since rest of equities did very well beating SPY this year. 

So the question is what to do now that it looks like sea has capitulated with the huge drop to 38.

Long story short, have used options to double down. Sell put buy long dated call to an effect of doubling holding. This will put my average price down to 60ish or so. 

Main reason is conviction this mgmt knows what they are doing. Let’s see next 1-2 years if we are right. 

Side note: psychology plays a big role. 3 points

- It’s much easier doing this double down this year than adding to FB or SPY, QQQ last year oct. Reason is last year everything and overall already down. So its very hard to add in a falling market. Had to force myself and in the end skipped one major chance though caught most of it.

- Overall, sea is our biggest stock gain ever. So it’s easier to have conviction when the 60% loss is 20% of the old gain. However, I am mindful this can end up being a blindspot to be too generous in our assessment of sea. Have to remember.

- note I used far out of money long dated call options to double down. So i am also limiting my losses to the call premiums while riding most of the upside esp if sea rebounds big. But for options side of things, I will take profit if it rallies big. Then switch into actual long holdings if we want to own more sea.

Tuesday, July 11, 2023

Learnings from key losses over last 12 years

(Update 9 mths later, I just wrote the article on learnings from wins too).

About S$3.5M from the more memorable badly made investments. That's since Jul 2011 when we actively started to track and run our portfolio of bonds, equities, forex and private equity. I am sharing because there are too few articles that discuss about investment losses and learnings. And I believe there is as much to learn from losses as there are from winners.  And a good investor needs to take into account both in order to succeed over time. 

Losses have always been on my mind esp since 2014 when we completely exited our business and switched from an entrepreneur mindset to an investor one. Prior to that, losses mattered less as our invested capital was always a small portion of our total net worth since most of our monetary net worth was tied up in human capital in the form of future salaries and in the company we owned. But once our invested capital becomes the main cash generator, tracking and analyzing losses and wins in investments becomes critical. 

Of course, as active investors, it’s not realistic to expect to make a gain in every investment. In fact, it is normal to have many bad calls/decisions and to lose money on some investments every year. What is desirable is to have strategies and policies that end up with more winners and maximize those winners while minimizing quantity and quantum of losses. And the big goal overall is to eke out a good return over the long term across entire portfolio value.

In the points that follow, I will attempt to group the key losses by asset type and reasons for the loss. Then I will share the learnings we gathered from that loss.  Also, to set the context, our investing experience has been good but not great (own yardstick) over the last 12 years to end June 2023.

1) Equity returns better than ACWI ETF 8+% total annual returns.

2) Fixed Income returns better than JNK ETF 3.5% total annual returns.  

3) PE investments (which are majority VC and startups) at  25-30% IRR which is strong but a lot of unrealized gains. 

So we feel we are doing fine because our returns more than pay for our annual expenses and are also above the financial planning targets we set 12 years ago. And the main internal controllable reason we achieved this is due to consistent asset allocation discipline. We are almost always fully allocated or even overallocated using leverage. So we never have cash dragging down returns. And almost always >>50% equity allocation. Second reason is a few decent single stock (eg. SEA, SHinvest, FB, GOOG etc)  & ETF selections with consistent & appropriate bite sizing . Would love to add a third on being able to cut loss quickly but cutting loss is not yet our strength as readers can see below.

Bearing all that in mind, here are our bigger memorable losses (in SGD). I exclude direct startup losses because the considerations and learnings are quite different but include PE or VC fund losses because fund manager selection mistakes can be pattern recognized more easily.

1) 500k - Bad fund manager selection on famous FMCG PE and a brand name European hedge fund. The 2 funds above were bought thru a private bank and they promptly went on to grossly underperform compared to peers and benchmark. So they had grossly negative alpha. 

The PE fund is still ongoing- sitting on 380K or about 50+% loss after 9 years of investing.  The fund did so much that don't make sense. Supposed to pick more stories like Charles & Keith, more china plays... instead they picked 2nd tier brands in australia, europe, SG , Middle east. And they reported greatly improved TVPI and IRR just when raising next fund a few years later - only to write portfolio back down once fund 3 was raised. And then later mgmt exited to a new buyer. Lesson here is fund managers are aligned to AUM which pays 2% annually much more than aligned to our returns. And be very skeptical of mark to market if it is not realized. Esp don't trust the numbers when fund is using it to raise new fund. Their incentive is to window dress their old fund numbers. 

Also one vintage does not prove anything. Go for fund managers that really have long track record. It implies a lot in terms of internal bench strength, professionalism etc.

The famous European hedge fund lost 20+% within 6 mths and closed down. Even the private bank that sold it had to say sorry. Lesson here? Beats me! for some reason the manager didn't even want to continue it. 

2) 900K - From 5 single bond & 1 recent fund losses. Back in 2013-2017, we were happily borrowing USD at 0.7% and then buying IG bonds at 3.5-4+%. This was a winning strategy until we decided to go after a bit more yield and went in Brazilian USD denominated IG credit and regional BB junk bonds. Unfortunately operation car wash hit,  there was the oil & gas crash worldwide and the regional single issuers had internal cash flow problems.

The first bond was the worst as we thought bonds can rebound and price action may behave like stocks. One huge learning is that bonds plunge at the slightest whiff of insolvency. And the risk reward is very poor for holding on or doubling down. At least for novice investors like us.  We watched the bond go down from 90+ to 70+ to 50+ to 30 and no buyer.  Could have sold along the way but did not. Big learning here.

Next few bond failures came over next 1-2 years. This time we learned to cut loss and got out at 70, 50 and one at 30+. 

Bigger lesson is individual bond failures sting badly and its better to get lower yield but be in really safe names. And safe means names we really know well in terms of their finances and jurisdiction.  So no EM bonds for us anymore even if IG grade. Bond professional investors are smart and they price risk reward carefully. So don't get too carried away by the absolute high yield of junk bonds.

Then after 5 years of careful bond investments that did well, we got greedy and listened to a CIO from a Swiss PB and got attracted to good YTM in Asian junk credit this year and bought early without conviction and multiple bites. We even levered for it as expected return over leverage was 7%. Just cut loss as it was never our intention to own more FI. Didn’t feel comfortable to deviate from plan esp once the fund fell by >5%.

3) 300K forex losses. Mainly due to long positions in the underlying asset which is overseas. For us it was mainly MYR, AUD, BRL. The first 2 were unavoidable as we owned a property in KL, have a malaysian startup stake in RM. We also invested in ASX stocks.  For the MYR, we already tried to hedge it by borrowing 70% but for AUD we did not as borrowing cost felt high compared to USD. But these 2 not so bad as our capital gain on the underlying assets more than offset the currency losses. But for BRL, it was a disaster as we used it to invest in IG credit from 2 Brazilian issuers. So while the issuer did not have any problems, the Brazilian real fell 30% or so. Ouch. 

Big lesson here is other than SGD and USD, we now don't want to own other currency as currency risk is totally unpredictable and foreign to us. Unlike equity risk. I would also add owning some JPY or EUR or GBP or AUD is a world apart from EM market currencies. The latter i will avoid at all costs. But the former, i am looking at JPY assets now as leverage is very cheap. Though I am reminding the tail must not wag the dog. Meaning leverage cheap is one plus but it is secondary to choosing the right asset, entry price and bite. 

4) 400K Option losses. We sell puts on stocks we want to own. We also buy calls on esp bullish positions. The losses come mainly from selling puts without enough research and using Private Bank ELNs. ELNs need min 100-200K. So we can't implement our multiple bites and average down strategy. This is very damaging if the ELN gets triggered as if we average down, the position gets very large for us. And if we lack conviction/get thesis wrong, the losses can be big. The other option losses come from averaging down on call options. Its the gambler mindset to want to average down and see a huge win if one gets its right. However, we have learned that call options must be used very carefully.  We now use the full value of the call as our position size and not just the option value. This prevents us from building too large positions in options that have time decay.  

5) 1.2M Equity Losses. This segment is largest but it’s put last as these losses come from 12 trades. So it’s $100K loss per trade. Smaller compared to bond or fund errors. And the reasons for the loss almost all boil down to 1 reason - 

Bought without enough research leading to a lack of conviction on the company. Insufficient research also means no strong opinion on fair value and momentum of company. This leads to us buying in too high and frequently too early and too many times. The above when combined with option losses is what accounts for most equity losses. And number 1 reason for lack of research is listening to  experts or friends. Most of the ideas that come from our internal synthesis and analysis tend to be good. Eg, our own call on QQQ/SPY last  year, call on SEA back in 2018, call on Shinvest, ifast, FB, lulu... etc etc. The ones where a smart professional does a smooth presentation and shares what they recommend tend to be disasters. The latest being the call on asian high yield early this year. 

6) 100k - crypto hedge fund invested in late 2021. Felt rich, joined too late, follow friend and without conviction. After 2 years, it’s also clear the managers aren’t good at generating alpha… riding the Alt coins market down in 2022 and failing to ride even eth and btc up this year.

So that's the sharing we have. The learnings from them can be summarize into

- Don't listen to experts or friends. Never buy because someone else said so and without deep knowledge. Buy because we formed a strong thesis on our own. Interestingly this is different from startup investing where following professional investors tend to be ok..

- Then research and think more until have conviction of where asset is going in near and longer term. 

- Have an entry and exit points for the asset

- Make sure ultimately correct bite sizing for that asset so we can stomach the ups and downs.

- Coldly execute and monitor. Don't ever panic sell or buy. Exception is single bonds, cut loss quick if have chance of insolvency. 

- If using fund managers, esp PE/VC,  go for tried and tested managers with long histories. Not just 1-2 vintage managers who may not have conviction and/or were just lucky to have big winner in one vintage. Also, don't blindly believe what they say esp on mark to market unrealized returns. Real distributions count not unrealized gains.

- Learn to cut loss faster. Applies to all assets except PE funds which cannot exit. This is one of our greatest weaknesses and we are trying hard to always clean house annually and keep to set rules on allocation. For single stocks, constantly review the stocks to reaffirm conviction to hold or add.

- Always stick to overall portfolio allocation which is planned and rebalanced every few mths. Don’t be tempted to move out of it if it’s working as expected.

- don’t borrow to go after smallish or mid size gains. Only leverage if returns are potentially huge to justify the fixed cost of leverage. Gains are not fixed, but interest payments are. 

-for cutting losses, treat each loss in isolation. $50-100k is still a lot of money to lose even if you made 2+m in gains this year. Don’t fall into the bad habit of saying overall made money, feel rich so it’s ok to hold out for rebound on a losing investment. Cut loss quickly once no conviction to hold. This is key to cutting loss well and right now, we are mulling over our China holdings thru this lens….

I hope the above sharing is useful to readers in that it exposes how much can go wrong when one is investing across multiple asset classes. Of course, we have many more profitable investments than losses last 12 years too. And we also have many more learnings from these winning trades/assets. The key is to combine the lessons from the winners and losers to get a sustainable long term investing strategy.